Rice v. Sallaz Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42161 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-20-2015
Rice v. Sallaz Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42161
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Rice v. Sallaz Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42161" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5377.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5377
IJ\ THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JANET RICE, individualiy and as successor ) 
in interest of EUGENE RICE, deceased and ) 
REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
iiaoility company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Respondents, ) 
Supreme Court Docket ;s.;o. 42161-2014 
Canyon County No. 2009-11855 
) RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
V. ) 
) 
DENNIS SALLAZ and REAL HOMES, ) 




GLENN TREFREN and TRADESMAN 
CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTIO:'\, 















FEB 2 0 2015 
Sai>ie1119Cowf.__C:Ourto!App8*-
Entareo on AiS by 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Response to Appeal from District Court of the Third Judicial District for Canyon County 
Honorable Juneai C. Kerrick, District Judge presiding 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
JANET RICE, individually and as successor ) 
in interest of EUGENE RICE, deceased and ) 
REAL PROPERTIES, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company, ) 
Plaintiffs-Co unterde fondants- Respondents, 
v. 
DENNIS SALLAZ and REAL HOMES, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and 
GLENN TR.EFREN and TRADESMAN 
CONTRACTORS AND CONSTRUCTION, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 



















Supreme Court Docket No. 42161-2014 
Canyon County No. 2009-11855 
RESPONDENTS' BRH(.F 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Response to Appeal from District Court of the Third Judicial District for Canyon County 
Honorable Juncal C. Kerrick, District Judge presiding 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS 
J. Kahle Becker 
Attorney at Law 
I 020 W. Main Street, Suite 400 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................ . 




STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................. . 
i\. NATURE OF THE CASE ............................................................. .. 
13. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS........................................................... 3 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS.............................................................. 6 
ADDITIONAL fSSUES ON APPEAL. .................................................. . 8 
A. RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATT0RNI:Y'S FEES AND 
COSTS ON APPEAi..... .. ... . .. .. .... ... .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. ... .. . ... . .. . . . .. . .. ... . . ... 8 
AR.Ci UM ENT ................................................................................ . 
A. 
13. 
S'IANl)ARD OF RI!VIEW ............................................................. . 
Tr IE H0U)ING OF Tl IE TRIAL COURT Sr I0UI.D BE AFFIRMED ................ .. 





TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M .................... 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 
Ba;rd-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 [daho 342,336 P.3d 275 (2014) ........................................... 1,5 
In Re Real Homes, LLC, Chapter I 1 Case No. 05-02051 (l3kr. D. Idaho 2005) ..................... 1, 7 
S"allaz v. Baird-Sallaz, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1217666 ....................................... 1,5 
Sallaz v. Rice, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253 
(Supreme Court Docket No. 42698-2014) ................................................................... 1 
Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 744, 979 P.2d 605 (I 999) .............. 3,9 
East Shoshone Hosp. Dist. v. Nonini, 109 [daho 937, 712 P.2d 638 (1985) ........................... 8 
flail v. Farmers Alliance 1vfut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313,320, 179 P.3d 276,283 (2008) ............. 9 
Smallv. State, 132 [daho 327,331,971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................. 9 
Crowley v. Lafayette L{/e Ins. Co .. 106 Idaho 818,821,683 P.2d 854,857 (1984) .................... 10 
Peterson v. Universal Automobile Ins. Co., 53 Idaho 11, 16, 20 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1933) ......... 10 
Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 133 Wash.2d 954,948 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1997) ..... 10 
Evans v. Twin Falls County. 118 Idaho 210,215,796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990) ........................... I0 
Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 [daho 173, 180-81, 45 
P.3d 829, 836-37 (2002) ..................................................................................... 10 
Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 116, 645 P.2d 344, 350 ( 1982) .................... 10 
O'Connor v. /larger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904,911, 188 P.3d 846,853 (2008) .................. 10 
State Statutes 
r.c. § 54-5201 .............................................................................................. 8,10 
I.C. § 73-116 .................................................................................................. 10 
State Rules 
I.A.R. 40 and 41 ............................................................................................... 8 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct 
f.R.P.C. I .7(a)(2) ............................................................................................... 3 
[.l~.P.C. l .8(a) ................................................................................................. 3 
l.R.P.C. 8.4(b), (c), (d) ...................................................................................... 6 
11 
I. 
STATfi:MENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is now the second case Dennis Sallaz has brought to this Court's attention which 
seeks to collaterally attack the judgment rendered in his divorce from Renee Baird; Sallaz v. 
Sallaz, Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M (R. Vol. 1 pp. 73, 78- 84, 87-88, 94-98, 112, 
114-115). Sec also Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 336 P.3d 275 (2014), reh'g denied 
(Nov. 6, 2014). The Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce spawned numerous other cases, several of which 
relate to the real property and Dennis Sallaz's failed fraudulent transaction which are the subject 
of Mr. Sallaz's present appeal. See In Re Real Ilomes, U,C, Chapter 11 Case No. 05-02051 
(Bkr. D. Idaho 2005) (R. Vol. 1 pp. 83-84); Sallaz v. Baird-,\'allaz, Ada County Case No. CV OC 
1217666 (an "Independent Action to Overturn Judgment" R. Vol. 4 pp. 694-706); sec also Sallaz 
v. Rice, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253 (portions of which Mr. Sallaz appealed as 
Supreme Court Docket No. 42698-2014). 
Various other Sallaz v. S'allaz collateral offshoot cases exist which arc not germane to the 
issues presently bcl<.Hc the Court. (For example, Sallaz and Gatewood challenged Renee Baird's 
right to receive unemployment after she was terminated from employment at the firm when she 
filed for divorce. Tr. pp. 82-83). By Respondents' counsel's count, since 2004 some aspect of 
Mr. Sallaz's divorce has been before approximately 12 district court judges, a 10-day jury trial in 
Sallaz v. Rice, Ada County Case No. CV OC 1107253, 2 bankruptcy judges, several magistrates, 
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3 Supreme Court appeals, and several administrative agencies. This matter represents a colossal 
waste of resources and ultimately reflects poorly on our justice system. 
This particular Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce offshoot case arises out of the following events. 
During the course of his 16-day divorce trial and on the eve of a foreclosure, Mr. Sallaz (a 
licensed attorney with over 40 years' experience) created an entity for his long time clients the 
Rices. (R. Vol. l pp. 73, 87; Tr. pp. 343, 351, 363). The entity was known as Real Properties, 
LLC. Id. This entity, and a subsequent contract Mr. Sallaz drafted, became a vehicle by which 
Mr. Sallaz attempted to cloud the title to assets which were subject to a restraining order in his 
divorce. (R. Vol. l pp. 73, 78- 84, 87-88, 94-98, 112, 114-115; Vol. 4 p. 662; Tr. p. 352). One 
of the assets was 15884 Riverside Rd. (Lot 1 B), the house which Mr. Sallaz's ex-wife, Renee 
Baird, owned jointly with Mr. Sallaz and in which she was residing during the divorce. (R. Vol. 
1 pp 67-72, 86-87, 97-98; Tr. pp. 367-368). Other parcels of real estate were owned by an entity 
Mr. Sallaz created with Renee Baird known as Real I [omes, LLC. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 73, 78- 84, 87-
88, 94-98, I 12, 114-115). As is discussed in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order from S"allaz v. S'allaz, Real Homes, LLC had dueling operating agreements and its assets 
had been transferred and clouded by a series of fraudulent transfers and I iens Mr. Sallaz and his 
handyman/client Mr. Trefren orchestrated. lei; Tr. pp. 707-708, 775-784. 
Following a holding adverse to his interest in his divorce and numerous motions for 
reconsideration decided against him, Mr. Sallaz instructed his clients, the Rices, to sue him, Mr. 
Trefrcn, and Ms. Baird to quiet title to the real estate Mr. Sallaz wrongfully sold them. (R. Vol. 
4 pp. 662-663). This case was initiated by the Rices and Real Properties, LLC at the request and 
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direction of Dennis Sallaz and his assignee Glen Trefren as !ling and supporting Defendants. 
Id. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Mr. Sallaz provided only a skeleton of the record of this case for review on appeal. At 
the outset, it is important to note the impact of case law Appellants' counsel, Vernon K. Smith, 
played a role in establishing in connection with his own monstrosity of a divorce. "Where an 
incomplete record is presented to an appellate court, missing portions of the record are presumed 
to support the action of the trial court." Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 [daho 732, 
744, 979 P.2d 605 (1999). Thus, Respondents will attempt to point the Court to citations in the 
skeleton record Appellants provided which best support Respondents' assertions. Based on the 
holding of Peasley v. Smith, Appellants face a difficult burden in asking for a reversal of the 
Trial Court's decision where much of their argument on appeal is based on conjecture. 
Following the initiation of this suit, which at its inception targeted the Sallaz-Baird 
marital community, the Rices began having their doubts that their long time legal counsel, 
Dennis Sallaz, had been forthright with them in inducing them to enter the Real [ Jomes/Real 
Properties transaction. Sec l.R.P.C. l.7(a)(2) and l.8(a). Through the efforts of their new 
counsel, his conversations with Ms. Baird and her divorce counsel (Debra Eismann), and a 
review or thousands of pages of documents and transcripts, the Rices and Real Properties, LLC 
learned that Mr. Sallaz was not truthful with them and that that the Real 1 [omcs/Real Properties 
contract was fraudulent. Specifically, the Rices came to discover Mr. Sallaz created multiple 
versions of Real I Iomes, LLC and attempted to sell Real Properties, LLC (the entity Mr. Sallaz 
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created for the Rices) his ex-wife's house which neither version of Real Homes, I owned on 
the date of the mid-divorce trial transfer. (R. Vol. 1 pp. 73, 78- 84, 87-88, 94-98, 112, 114-115). 
The Rices settled this case with Ms. Baird early on. (R. Vol. I pp. 142-143; Tr. pp. 130-
136). The result of the settlement was that Ms. Baird was given title to her home, Riverside Lot 
l B, and the Rices through Real Properties, LLC retained ownership of the other 3 Riverside lots, 
as well as the Smith Street property. Tr. pp. 59, 300. Ms. Baird was dismissed from the case and 
wasneverrcjoinedasapartythereafl:cr. R. Vol. I pp. 142-144. 
[n an effort to extricate themselves from the quagmire Mr. Sallaz had gotten them into, 
the Rices and Real Properties, LLC then dismissed the bulk of the claims Mr. Sallaz instructed 
them to file (the Rice's Motion and Sallaz' Opposition thereto were not provided by Mr. Sallaz 
but the pleadings arc listed in the Register of Actions at R. Vol. I pp. 8-9; sec also R. Vol. 4 pp. 
551-552). Thereafter, Mr. Trcfrcn filed counterclaims on his own behalf as well as his entity 
Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC (an entity Dennis Sallaz created for Mr. Trefrcn; 
sec R. Vol. l p. 81), and as "assignee" of Dennis Sallaz. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 326-335; Vol. 4 p. 553; 
Tr. pp. 690-698). These counterclaims necessitated a court trial. 
Mr. Sallaz makes a half-hearted effort to hide his claims and his appeal behind his proxy, 
Glen Trefren. Despite making overlapping conflicting assignments of the entirety of his alleged 
interest in the subject contract (R. Vol. 3 p. 507; Vol. 4 pp 638 and 640), Mr. Sallaz claimed at 
trial he was personally owed money (Tr. pp. 946, 956), Mr. Sallaz's law firm was preparing Mr. 
Trcfrcn's pleadings (Tr. pp I 063-1064), Mr. Sallaz' counsel Vernon K. Smith presented Mr. 
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Trcfren's case at trial (Tr. p I 069 L. 16-1 
prepared the brief for "Appellant~" on appeal. 
4 109 l L. 14), and Vernon Smith 
To this day, Mr. Sallaz maintains a !is pendens on Riverside lot 1 B, the house which was 
awarded to Renee Baird in the Sallaz v. S"allaz divorce (R. Vol. I pp. 97-98; R. Vol. 3 pp. 362 -
374 -- specifically p. 369 as to Riverside lot l B; Tr. p. 59). Thus, despite being awarded this 
parcel in the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce, obtaining her discharge in bankruptcy, having been 
dismissed as a party from this case, and the dismissal of Mr. Sallaz' "Independent Action to 
Overturn Judgment," this appeal has served to stifle Ms. Baird's attempts to sell or refinance her 
residence. Sallaz v. ,')'allaz, Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M (R. Vol. I pp. 73, 78- 84, 
87-88, 94-98, 112, 114-115); Baird-,')'ctllaz v. S'allaz, 157 [daho 342, 336 P.3d 275 (2014), rch'g 
denied (Nov. 6, 2014); Sallaz v. Baird-Sallaz, J\da County Case No. CV OC 1217666 (R. Vol. 4 
pp. 694-706); (R. Vol. l pp. 142-144 ). Likewise, a now widowed Ms. Rice remains tied to these 
distressed and dilapidated properties. Tr. p. 60-62. 
Though the facts of this case arc convoluted and complex, this matter can be resolved 
expeditiously in Respondents' favor by affirming the holding of the Trial Court based on one 
simple premise: Real Homes, (the Sallaz/Trefren version) never entered its appearance 
or pursued any counterclaims against plaintiff Real Properties, LLC (the entity Dennis 
Sallaz created for his clients, the Rices). (R. Vol. I pp. 129-131; 145-147; R. Vol. 2 pp. 326-
335; Vol. 4 p. 570). Tlrns, there is no relief sought below on behalf of the Sallaz/Trefren version 
of Real I Tornes, LLC which would entitle Appellants to any relief from this Court. Similarly, 
Defendants never filed a Counterclaim for quiet title or made a tender of funds which might 
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make the equitable remedy of rescission available. Therefore, the holding of the Trial Court 
should be affirmed. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts giving rise to this case, as well as Mr. Sallaz's other fraudulent asset hiding 
antics in his divorce, arc described in the Findings of fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order from 
Sallaz v. Sallaz, Ada County Case No. CV-DR-04-01075M (R. Vol. 1 pp. 73, 78- 84, 87-88, 94-
98, 112, 114-115). All justices participating in the decision on this appeal are strongly urged to 
review the Findings of /<act, Conclusions of Law, and Order, including portions referring to 
Dennis Sallaz's deposit of $387,000 into a bank account he opened in the name of his long since 
deceased grandmother's estate (R. Vol. I pp. 77-78, 100-101) and his entry into a safe deposit 
box approximately 30 minutes before a court ordered inspection and subsequent testimony which 
Judge Epis described as "not truthful." (R. Vol. I pp. 86). Sec LR.P.C. 8.4(b), (c), (d). 
On January 6, 2006, in the middle of his 16-day divorce trial, Dennis Sallaz purported to 
sell his longtime clients, the Rices, several parcels of real estate in Canyon County, ostensibly 
owned by Real Homes, LLC, by creating an entity known as Real Properties, LLC. (R. Vol. 1 
pp. 73, 78- 84, 87-88, 94-98, 112, 114-115). One of these parcels (Riverside Lot 1 Baka 15584 
Riverside) had been transferred out of Real I lornes, LLC and was legally in the name of Dennis 
and Renee Sallaz (Baird). (Tr. pp 156-158). 
Likewise, Mr. Trefren had clouded the title to the subject real estate by quitclaiming 
some of the parcels into his wholly owned Tradesman Contractors and Construction LLC, filing 
liens on those same parcels his LLC now purported to own, and subsequently filing for 
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bankruptcy on behalf of Real I listing his own liens as debts on property he had 
purportedly quitclaimed to Tradesman out of Real Homes, LLC. See In Re Real !Iomes, LLC, 
Chapter l l Case No. 05-02051 (Bkr. D. Idaho 2005) (R. Vol. 1 pp. 83-84). Mr. Trefren testified 
that all of his actions were done to "cloud" the title. Tr. pp. 775-784. 
Following a holding adverse to his interest in his divorce, Mr. Sallaz wrongfully 
instructed his clients, the Rices, to sue him, Mr. Trefren, and his ex-wife Ms. Baird to quiet title 
to the real estate Mr. Sallaz wrongfully sold them. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 662-663). What Mr. Sallaz 
actually sold his clients was a nightmare of a lawsuit (Tr. p. I 035). The Rices set out to do the 
right thing and respect the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order from Sallaz v. 
Sallaz. They settled with Renee 13aird and dismissed their claims Mr. Sallaz had instructed them 
to file. (R. Vol. l pp. 142-144 ). Renee Baird was given title to her home, Riverside Lot l B, and 
the Rices, through Real f Io mes, LLC, retained ownership of the other three lots at Riverside and 
the Smith Street house. (R. Vol. I pp. 142-143; Tr. pp. 59, 130-136, 300). This settlement 
angered Mr. Sallaz. Tr. p. 953. 
Mr. Trcfrcn, as "assignee" of Dennis Sallaz, then filed counterclaims which necessitated 
a trial. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 326-335; Vol. 4 p. 553; Tr. pp. 690-698). Despite asserting claims that 
precluded a settlement or dismissal, Mr. Sallaz and Trefrcn sought to delay trial by taking a 
marathon 74 hour deposition of Roy Rice, who lay dying of COPD and ultimately cancer. 
( Register of Actions at R. Vol. I pp. 12-16; Tr. pp. 411-413, 816). 
Mr. Trcfrcn's and Mr. Sallaz's version of Real Ilomcs, LLC never entered its appearance 
and never filed a counterclaim in this case. (R. Vol. 2 p. 340; Vol. 4 pp. 570). Mr. Trcfren and 
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Mr. Sallaz never sought to have control of Real I fomes, transferred to them the Trial 
Court. At all times the only claim for relief was by Glen Trcfren individually and as assignee or 
Dennis Sallaz. Mr. Trefren's Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC asserted claims for 
labor and materials without being licensed under LC. § 54-5201 et seq. (R. Vo!. 4 pp. 576- 584). 
The record is devoid of any tender of funds which would support an argument for the remedy of 
recession Countcrclaimants now advance. (Tr. p. 4-5). 
Likewise, neither Mr. Sallaz, Mr. Trefren, Real I fomcs, LLC, nor Tradesman Contractors 
and Construction, LLC filed a counterclaim for quiet title. Despite this legal misstep and the 
claim preclusion flowing therefrom, in their Motion for Reconsideration Appellants have 
telegraphed their desire to collaterally attack the decision of the Trial Court with yet another 
round of frivolous litigation flowing from the Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 615 617). 
IL 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPl(AL 
A. RESPONDENT IS l{NTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an award of attorney fees and costs for defending against this frivolous 
appeal pursuant to I.J\.R. 40 and 41. The standard for making an award of attorney fees on 
appeal is whether the appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without f'oundation. Hast Shoshone 1/osp. Dist. v. Nonini, 109 Idaho 937,712 P.2d 638 (1985). 
As is discussed below, this appeal is being pursued by parties to which no relief is available 
based on the failure of Real I lorncs, ] ,LC to assert a counterclaim before the Trial Court. The 
award of Respondents' fees and costs should therefore be made against Dennis Sallaz and Glen 
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Trefren 111 individual 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
HL 
ARGUMENT 
fn [daho, "[t]he standard of review applicable to questions of law is one of deference to 
factual findings, but we freely examine whether statutory and constitutional requirements have 
been met in light of the fi1cts as found." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 
320, 179 P.3d 276, 283 (2008). Where an incomplete record is presented to an appellate court, 
missing portions of the record arc presumed to support the action of the trial court. Peasley 
Transfer & ,\"forage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732,744,979 P.2d 605 (1999). Generally, issues 
not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. Srnall v. State, 132 Idaho 
327, 33 I, 971 P.2d 1151, 11 (Ct. App. 1998). 
B. Tm: HOLDING OF TIIE TRIAL COURT SIIOlJLD B1,: AFFIRMED 
Respondents adopt the reasoning of the Trial Court, as to the issues on appeal, in its 
entirety. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 570-587; R. Vol 5 pp. 800-809). Specifically, the Trial Court found 
"Real I lorncs, LLC is not a party to the counterclaim and has not asserted any claim with respect 
to the real property transferred to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreeme11t." (R. Vol. 2 
p. 340; Vol. 4 pp. 570). Thus, the bulk of the relief Counterclaimants now seek is based on 
conjecture derived from an incomplete record, a claim that was not properly asserted below, and 
is on behalf of a party who has never asserted a claim as a Countcrclaimant before the Trial 
Court. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF Page 9 
[t docs not appear that any aspect of Count I[ of the Counterclaim labor and materials 
in violation of LC.§ 54-5201 et seq.) has been appealed. (R. Vol. 4 pp. 576-584). 
The decision of the Trial Court in dispensing with Appellants' restitution argument is 
even more straightforward. In addition to the failure to properly assert a counterclaim on behalf 
of the real party in interest, Mr. Trefren and Mr. Sallaz never made a timely tender of the funds 
the Rices and/or Real Properties, LLC expended. 
Rescission of a contract is intended to place the parties in the positions they occupied 
prior to the contract and is available only when one of the parties has committed a 
material breach, which destroys the entire purpose for entering into the contract. See 
Crowley v. l,afayette L[/e Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818, 821, 683 P.2d 854, 857 (1984). 
The party desiring to rescind a contract must, prior to rescinding, tender back to 
the other party any consideration or benefit received under the contract by the 
rescindinf{ party. See id,· see also Peterson v. Universal Autmnobile Ins. Co., 53 
Idaho 11, 16, 20 P.2d 1016, I 021 (1933) (The company, after notice of the ground for 
forfeiture, by retaining the premium without canceling the policy, waives the 
breach.); Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 133 Wash.2d 954, 948 P.2d 
1264, 1274 (1997); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 512 (1964); 17/\ C.J.S. Contracts§ 439 
(1963). These rules of the common law arc in effect in Idaho unless modified by other 
legislative enactments. See LC. § 73-116; Fvans v. Twin Falls County. 118 Idaho 210, 
215, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (1990). 
Rohinson v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180-81, 45 P.3d 829, 
836-37 (2002). (Emphasis added). 
Countcrclaimants foiled to provide any evidence that they made a timely tender to Real 
Properties, LLC. 
/\ party seeking to rescind a contract ordinarily must return any consideration or the 
benefit received by the rescinding party before the rescission is valid. Robinson, 137 
Idaho at 181, 45 P.3d at 837. More than a mere offer or the deposit is required; the 
party must exhibit an actual intent and willingness to pay to constitute a valid tender. 
Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, I 16, 645 P.2d 344, 350 ( 1982). 
O'Connor v. I larger Const., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 91 I, 188 P.3d 846, 853 (2008). 
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Finally, Appellants have not appealed the Trial s decision that Roy Rice was not 
personally liable on the Real Ifomes/Rcal Properties contract. (R. Vol. 2 pp. 347-349; Vol. 3 p. 
508). Therefr)rc, should the Court desire to reverse the decision of the Trial Court, any relief on 
remand would only apply to the entity Real Properties, LLC. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
This case and the other Sallaz v. Sallaz divorce offshoot cases arc an illustration of what 
our civil justice system will devolve into if procedural and criminal safeguards arc not enforced. 
The doctrines of collateral cstoppel and resjudicata serve to prevent re-litigation or issues and 
claims which were previously decided. Judicial estoppel and quasi-estoppcl arc supposed to 
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the fi.1cts. Judgments should be enforced and not 
dodged. The crime of pc(jury makes no distinction between civil and criminal cases. 
Prosccutorial discretion should not be synonymous with prosccutorial apathy. Enforcement of 
civil perjury should allow for the application of I.R.E. 609(a) to prevent untruthful witnesses 
from spinning additional lies. The Rules of ProCcssional Conduct arc designed to deter and 
ultimately purge our system of dishonesty by officers of the court. Holding egregious 
professional disciplinary matters in abeyance for years while a civil case plays out can allow 
unscrupulous attorneys to continue to bring our profession into disrepute. 
This ordcaL only a portion of which is presently before this Court, represents a 
breakdown in our civil justice system and is a disgrace to the legal profession. Respondents ask 
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The undersigned hereby certifies that on this ___,___ __ day of February 2015, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RE5:PO!'iDJ:t:r:rs~ :inrn:F was served upon opposing counsel as 
follows: 
Vernon K. Smith 
1900 W. Main St. 
Boise, ID 83687 
Attorney.for Appellants 
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